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Kontinkäsittely satamaterminaaleissa muuttuu jatkuvasti automaattisemmaksi. Automa-
tiikka ei kuitenkaan ainakaan nykyisellään kykene huolehtimaan jokaisesta konttikentän 
operaatiosta. Ihmisen suorittamaa ohjausta vaaditaan esimerkiksi, kun sensoridata ei ole 
riittävää tai toiminnan turvallisuutta ei pystytä takaamaan täysin automatiikan hoitamana. 
Tämän kaltainen poikkeustilannekäsittely tehdään yleensä kauko-ohjauksena tätä tarkoi-
tusta varten valmistettua ohjainlaitetta käyttäen. Kauko-ohjaaja ohjaa videokuvan perus-
teella nosturia laitteen ohjaimia käyttäen. 
 
Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena oli analysoida ja määrittää kauko-ohjaimelle asetet-
tavat turvallisuusvaatimukset. Tavoitteena oli täydellisen riskianalyysin tekeminen näihin 
vaatimuksiin perustuen. Turvallisuusvaatimusten määrittely edellytti laajaa tutkimustyötä 
koneturvallisuuden standardeista ja aihetta käsittelevistä tutkimuksista. Tällä hetkellä eri-
tyisesti satamanostureiden etäohjausta käsittelevää turvallisuusstandardia ei ole ole-
massa. Turvallisuustyö vaatikin runsaasti erilaisten tulkintojen tekemistä ja eri lähteistä 
hankitun tiedon yhdistämistä.  
 
Työn merkittävin löydös oli ihmisen vaikutus etäoperoinnin turvallisuuteen. Monet ny-
kyisen etäohjainlaitteen turvaominaisuuksista perustuvat käyttäjän tekemiin havaintoihin, 
vaikka operointiympäristö ei itsessään tue käyttäjän tarkkaavaisuutta millään tavalla. On-
gelman todettiin olevan suurin, kun etäoperointia tekee henkilö, joka on aiemmin ajanut 
manuaalista satamanosturia. Muutos nosturin hytistä toimistoympäristöön johtaa helposti 
kyllästymiseen ja tarkkaavaisuuden laskemiseen. 
 
 
Etäohjainlaitetta koskevat riskianalyysit tehtiin perustuen tutkimustyön aikana tunnistet-
tuihin turvallisuusvaatimuksiin. Analyysien yhteydessä määritettiin riskinhallintamene-
telmät, joiden tavoitteena on ennaltaehkäistä käyttäjän kyllästymisestä sekä tahattomista 
ohjainliikkeistä johtuvia vaaroja. Tutkimustyön aikana tehtyjä löydöksiä pystytään käyt-
tämään hyödyksi myös tulevaisuudessa, kun etäoperoinnin turvallisuutta pyritään paran-
tamaan. 
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The level of automation in container terminals is constantly growing. The automation 
cannot handle reliably every single phase of the container handling, at least for now. Hu-
man intervention is needed if the sensor data fails or if the situation cannot be automati-
cally performed at a required safety level. This type of exception handling is usually done 
remotely using a designated remote control desk. The remote operator uses the controllers 
on the desk and executes the task at hand with the aid of live video feed from the terminal. 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the safety requirements for a remote control 
desk. The objective of the thesis was to produce a complete risk analysis for the design 
of the desk. Determining the relevant safety requirements required extensive research on 
the machine safety standards and studies on remote operation. Currently there are no spe-
cific standards for remote control of container handling equipment. This meant that the 
safety work required a great deal of interpretation and combining relevant aspects of dif-
ferent kinds of studies and researches.  
 
The most important finding in this study was the effect that human factors have on the 
safety of remote operation. Many of the safety features in the current design of the remote 
control desk rely on the observations made by the operator yet the remote operation desk 
does not promote the operator’s alertness in any way. The issue is greatest when the re-
mote operator is a person who has previously worked in the cabin of a manual crane and 
is transferred to the office environment. This can result in boredom and lack of concen-
tration. 
 
 
A preliminary hazard analysis and an operational hazard analysis were made on basis of 
the safety requirements recognized during the research on standards and studies. The 
analyses provided risk reduction methods to prevent risks arising from an operator’s lack 
of concentration and unintentional operating commands. The findings of the survey can 
also be utilized and further developed in the future projects around the concept of remote 
operation. 
 
 
Key words: container handling equipment, remote control, machine safety, standard, 
hazard analysis 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS 
 
 
CHE Container handling equipment  
OHA Operational Hazard Analysis 
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
RC Remote Control 
ROS Remote operating station 
Stacking area Container stack and area around it at terminals 
STS Ship-to-shore 
UX User experience design 
Quayside  Quay and area around it at terminals 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Remote operation station is a device used for remotely operating container handling 
equipment. It is mainly used for exception handling, which means that the remote opera-
tor can take control of the automated crane when the onboard automation system fails to 
complete the task in hand. Kalmar’s current remote control station was developed back 
in 2006. Since then the desk has been updated several times and this thesis was part of 
one major renewal.  
 
As a part of the development of the console, risk analysis was done. The new desk was 
intended to support safe operation and operator well-being. Currently there are no specific 
safety and health requirements for remote operation stations of container handling equip-
ment. This thesis is part of the work done to recognize the valid safety requirements of 
the console design and is done for Kalmar’s Safety and Risk Management.  
 
As an outcome of this project, clear requirements for the console design are provided. 
The specification of the requirements is done by a broad research on the machine safety 
standards and studies regarding machine and remote operation. The findings from the 
standards and studies are documented for future use and the ongoing design work for the 
console is going to meet these requirements. The findings are further utilized whilst mak-
ing a preliminary hazard analysis and operational hazard analysis for the console.  
 
This thesis is structured as follows: chapter 2 introduces Cargotec and its operations. 
Chapter 3.1 provides a sweeping description of the machinery the ROS is used with, cre-
ating a baseline for the risk assessment. Chapter 3.2 consists of theoretical basic infor-
mation of remote operation and in particular remote operation of CHE. Chapter 4 presents 
the main part of this thesis: it provides a detailed overview of the recognized safety re-
quirements and design objectives, which have an effect on the safety of the operation. 
Chapter 5 introduces briefly the risk analysis for the ROS. The analysis are company 
confidential so the description is very high level. Thesis concludes with discussion of the 
results of the project and the future possibilities. 
8 
 
2 COMPANY 
 
Cargotec is a global company based in Helsinki Finland. It is a leading provider of cargo 
handling equipment and solutions with a mindset on becoming the global leader in intel-
ligent cargo handling. Cargotec consists of three separate business areas; Kalmar, Hiab 
and MacGregor all focusing on different specific areas of cargo handling. It had 11 184 
employees in 45 countries at the end of year 2016. The headquarters of the company is 
based in Finland but the company also has production facilities in several other countries. 
Cargotec’s production facilities can be found in, for example, Malaysia, Poland, Germany 
and Sweden. Majority of the production has been outsourced to business partners operat-
ing in Asia. (Cargotec 2018a.) 
 
As a company Cargotec was born in year 2005 when Finnish company called Kone oyj 
was split into two separate independent companies Cargotec and KONE. However, the 
history of Cargotec is much longer since Kalmar, which is nowadays part of Cargotec, 
saw the light of the day for almost hundred years ago. Since 2005 Cargotec has undergone 
several major changes cultivating Cargotec to the company it is now. (Cargotec 2018b.) 
 
In 2007 Cargotec completed several takeovers on the smaller companies in the industry 
thus increasing the total amount of employees of Cargotec by over a thousand people. In 
2010 a new Cargotec factory was opened in Poland. By the time of opening the factory 
was one of the most important production facilities for Cargotec in Europe since its loca-
tion perfectly served the constantly growing markets in Europe. The factory also presents 
state of the art technology when it comes to factory automation and energy efficiency. 
2011 became one of the most distinct years in Cargotec’s history as Cargotec bought 
Navis from Zebra Technologies Corporation. Navis was back then and still is the leading 
provider of Terminal Operating Systems in the world. With the takeover of Navis Cargo-
tec really took a step forward into coming a software lead company and a provider of 
intelligent cargo handling solutions. In May 2013 Cargotec opened a Technology and 
Competence Centre in Tampere Finland. The Centre serves as a home for research and 
development of intelligent terminal equipment and automation. The building itself, being 
illustrated in picture 1, is one of the most energy efficient office buildings in Finland. In 
the most recent years Cargotec has continued on its path towards becoming the leading 
provider of terminal automation. The year 2016 saw two significant milestones for Car-
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gotec. It bought a company called Interschalt Maritime Systems AG, which provides mar-
itime software and solutions. Cargotec also founded Cargotec IoT Cloud as a platform 
for products utilizing the digitalization. (Cargotec 2018b.) 
 
 
 
PICTURE 1. Cargotec Technology and Competence Centre in Tampere is one of the most 
energy efficient office buildings in Finland. (Cargotec 2018b) 
 
In the first three quarters of 2017 Cargotec’s total sales were a bit over 3 300 million 
euros. Geographically Cargotec’s sales are divided quite evenly as illustrated in the figure 
1. Majority of the sales was done in EMEA area being shortly followed by the AMER 
area and APAC area. (Cargotec 2018c) 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Geographical split of Cargotec’s sales between Q4/16-Q3/17. (Cargotec 
2018c) 
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Kalmar is offering equipment and solutions for cargo handling in ports. In the first three 
quarters of 2017 Kalmar’s net sales were a bit over 1 600 million euros making about 50 
percent of the total sales of Cargotec. Kalmar’s sales is divided into equipment and ser-
vices and Kalmar software and automation. The equipment and services makes about 
1 200 million euros of Kalmar’s sales rest being covered by the sales of automation and 
software. Kalmar’s main global competitors are such companies as Konecranes, Terex 
and Liebherr. (Cargotec 2018c.) 
 
Hiab on the other hand focuses on providing cargo handling solutions for inland trans-
portation. In the first three quarters of 2017 Hiab’s net sales were a bit over 1 000 million 
euros making about 32 percent of the total sales of Cargotec. Hiab’s sales have gone up 
about 13 percent in the last twelve months making it the highlight of Cargotec’s year 
2017. Hiab’s only main global competitor is a company called Palfinger. (Cargotec 
2018c.) 
 
MacGregor’s products are used at seas thus completing the full range of equipment pro-
vided by Cargotec. The sales made by MacGregor make up the smallest portion of total 
sales of Cargotec being just over 600 million euros. MacGregor’s main competitor glob-
ally is Rolls-Royce. (Cargotec 2018c.) 
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3 BASIS FOR RESEARCH 
 
3.1 CHE in the scope 
 
Kalmar is providing support for all kinds of container handling equipment. The level of 
automation in the container terminals is still very limited and just a few terminals have 
developed totally automated processes. However the level of automation in the terminals 
is constantly increasing and Kalmar is developing solutions to answer this demand of 
equipment ranging from semi-automated to totally automated. (Kalmar. 2018a.) 
 
Kalmar’s current mindset is that all automated and semi-automated machinery should be 
operable with a remote control device. The remote control desk being designed is going 
to be able to control five different kinds of control handling equipment; Automated Strad-
dle Carrier, Automated Shuttle Carrier, ASC, AutoRMG and AutoRTG. (Kalmar. 2018a.) 
 
Before starting the safety work on the renewal of the ROS it was necessary to familiarize 
with the CHE in the scope of the project. All machines are used for different kinds of 
operation in the terminal area and this way the use cases for the remote operation station 
consist of a variety of situations. It would also be practically impossible to determine the 
hazards arising from the ROS without knowing the operation of each machine. For ex-
ample, determining the possible risk level is completely different if the machine is oper-
ating inside a fully automated area where no humans should be present versus the ma-
chinery operating with humans always in the vicinity of the machine.  
 
 
3.1.1 Automated Shuttle Carrier 
 
Shuttle carriers are used to transport the containers from the quayside to the stack to be 
handled by a machinery operating at the stacking area. Typically, an STS crane unloads 
the containers from the vessel. The STS can load the containers directly to the ground or 
on top of a trailer of truck or terminal tractor. The most efficient way is to unload the 
container to the ground thus enabling the STS crane to unload the vessel at a maximum 
speed without having to wait the CHE to come and receive the container. Shuttle carriers, 
illustrated in picture 2, can pick and land the containers directly on the ground so other 
cranes will not have to wait. (Kalmar 2018b.) 
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Kalmar shuttle carriers are known to be very flexible and agile machines as their lifting 
capacity reaches 50 tons and they can handle containers ranging from 20 ft to 50 ft. Shuttle 
carriers can also handle two 20ft containers simultaneously when fitted with a twin-lift 
spreader. Kalmar’s shuttle carrier’s each wheel can be steered individually enabling it to 
turn round its own vertical axis. In addition, the carriers are featured with an active sta-
bility control which monitors the movements of the machine slowing it down in hazard-
ous situations helping the operator to drive the machine safely.  Kalmar provides its cus-
tomers with three possible drive units for shuttle carriers to choose from. (Kalmar 2018b.) 
 
 
PICTURE 2. Kalmar shuttle carriers have a lifting capacity up to 50 tons. (SAE Interna-
tional 2008.) 
 
Kalmar Shuttle Carrier has a diesel-electric drive and it has been engineered to meet 
the latest exhaust emission regulations. The fuel efficiency and noise levels have also 
been minimized to provide terminal operators with a cost-efficient solution for quayside 
container movement. (Kalmar 2018b.) 
 
Kalmar Hybrid Shuttle Carrier combines traditional combust engine and energy har-
vesting. The energy generated when braking and lowering the carried load is captured 
and stored in lithium-ion batteries. Compared to the traditional shuttle carrier the hybrid 
uses up to 40% less fuel and the carbon dioxide emissions are reduced by up to 50 tons 
per annum. (Kalmar 2018b.) 
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Kalmar FastCharge Shuttle Carrier is electrically driven and has a rechargeable bat-
tery system which can be charged at the terminal between operational moves. The 
FastCharge shuttle carriers operate in combination with a FastCharge charging station 
which is illustrated in picture 3. The stations are placed on site thus enabling the shuttle 
carriers being charged in the middle of normal operation. The machines are typically 
charged between 30 to 180 seconds at a power of 600 kilowatts. (Kalmar 2018b.) 
 
 
PICTURE 3. Kalmar FastCharge charging station enables the shuttle carrier to operate 
continuously. (Kalmar 2017a.) 
 
Regardless of the type of the power unit all Kalmar’s shuttle carriers can be automated. 
Automatic shuttle carriers can operate independently and complete a variety of terminal 
operation tasks.  
 
 
3.1.2 Automated Straddle Carrier 
 
Straddle Carriers are very similar to the shuttle carriers when it comes to technical details 
or the intended use of the machinery. Kalmar’s straddle carriers are also delivered with 
three possible selections for the drive unit of the machinery; FastCharge, Hybrid and 
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Diesel-electric. Compared to the shuttle carriers the straddle carriers are even more ver-
satile and can complete every task regarding the operations on the stack field. The straddle 
carries can stack containers up to four containers high and have a lifting capacity up to 
60 tons enabling them to also move the containers on stacking area. Straddle carriers are 
also used for delivering containers from the stack to the trucks. As seen on picture 4 the 
straddle carriers are technically almost identical to shuttle carriers but significantly 
higher. (Kalmar 2018c.) 
 
PICTURE 4. Straddle carriers are much higher than shuttle carriers. (Konecranes 2018.) 
 
Straddle carriers can also be fully or partly automated according to the requirements set 
by the terminal operator. Also the already existing manually controlled machines can be 
transformed to be even fully automatic. (Kalmar 2018c) The automation of straddle car-
rier operations is becoming more and more popular.  
 
 
3.1.3 ASC 
 
ASC stands for Automated Stacking Crane and it is a fully automated crane used for 
stacking area operations. The ASCs are seen as a complete system rather than individual 
machines. The ASC system consists of variety of different levels of automation solutions 
and software. The system is managed by Kalmar TLS which is a control system handling 
the operation of the ASCs. TLS controls routing and planning in the stacking area and 
executes the automated operations.  (Kalmar 2015.) 
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TLS combines the automated machines of the fleet with the terminal operating system. 
The TLS receives desired container movements from the terminal operating system and 
manages the operations of each machine based on their status and location. TLS can mon-
itor the status of the whole fleet as well as status of each individual machine. This enables 
the TLS to plan the movements of machinery as well as containers in the most efficient 
way. (Kalmar 2017e.) 
 
With automatic stacking cranes the whole procedure of getting the container from the 
vessel to the truck can be automated. Typically, automated shuttle carriers collect the 
containers from the STS crane unloading them from the vessel. The shuttle carriers then 
deliver the containers to the stacking area in which the automated stacking crane moves 
them to the desired location. The ASC can also operate the truck lane automatically based 
on the orders received from the terminal operating system. The system is illustrated in 
picture 6. The automated truck handling is based on laser measurement illustrated in a 
conceptual picture 7. The system measures the locations of a truck trailers twistlocks and 
this information is fed to the crane. With the known location of the twistlocks the ASC 
can pick or ground the container automatically. In normal operation there is no need for 
human intervention. Operators control the crane only during exception handling situa-
tions. (Kalmar 2014.) 
 
 
PICTURE 6. Automated stacking crane system. (Kalmar 2015.) edited. 
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PICTURE 7. Laser measurement enables automated truck handling. (Kalmar 2014.) 
 
The ASC crane itself moves on rails and has three degrees of freedom. The movement on 
the rails is called gantry movement and can be understood as a movement towards water-
side and away from the waterside. “Sideways” movement is called trolley movement. 
Trolley is mounted with the lifting equipment of the crane. The up and down movement 
is called hoist movement.  
 
 
3.1.4 AutoRTG 
 
Kalmar’s RTG or Rubber Tyred Gantry is a machine used for similar kinds of operation 
as the ASC so the basic operation for RTG crane is to manage the incoming and outgoing 
containers at the container stack. RTG cranes are typically operated by an onboard driver 
and run on diesel engines although electrically driven ones are also available. The width 
of the RTG is typically between  five and eight containers and the height is typically 
between three and five containers. (Conductix Wampfler 2018.) 
 
RTG crane uses air inflated tyres for the gantry movements and the direction of the gantry 
movement can be changed by turning the wheels which is one core feature separating it 
from the rail mounted cranes such as ASC or RMG. The crane has four separate drive 
17 
 
modes which affect the position of the wheels in relation to the structure or frame of the 
crane. The four drive modes are called traverse drive, longitudinal drive, carousel drive 
and parking position. Longitudinal drive and traverse drive are illustrated in picture 8, the 
A being traverse and B being longitudinal drive. (Kalmar 2017f, 29-30.) 
 
PICTURE 8. Drive modes of the RTG crane. (Kalmar 2017f, 30.) 
 
The crane can be steered in longitudinal and traverse drive modes. Steering is controlled 
by alternating the speed of the drive motors of the wheels instead of turning the wheels. 
(Kalmar 2017f, 30.) In the carousel mode the wheels are turned to a position which ena-
bles the turning movement of the crane and in the parking mode the crane is locked in 
position by turning the wheels in a position which makes moving impossible (Kalmar 
2017f, 73.).  The position of the wheels in parking mode and in carousel mode can be 
seen in picture 9 in which the A stands for carousel mode and B for the parking position.  
 
 
 
PICTURE 9. Position of RTG cranes wheels in carousel and parking modes. (Kalmar 
2017f, 74.) 
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The operational difference between RTG cranes and ASCs is that on the RTG operation 
the truck lane is located below the crane in between the container stacks but in the ASC 
operation the truck lane is located at the end of each container stack as seen in picture 7. 
The location of the truck lane in RTG operation is illustrated in picture 10. 
 
 
PICTURE 10. Location of the truck lane in RTG operation. (Kalmar 2016.) 
 
Existing manually controlled RTG can be automated or the RTG can be built automatic 
from the beginning. The automated RTG operation can be built with certain level of au-
tomation. Regardless of the level of the automation the operation is controlled by the 
Kalmar TLS system. There are five possible levels of automation. (Kalmar 2017g.) 
 
Remote control means that the operator controls the crane remotely with a remote oper-
ation station. The operator is provided with live camera views from the RTG fleet and the 
operator utilizes them and the controllers provided in the remote control desk to operate 
the crane. The remote operation station is usually located at a separate yard control center. 
(Kalmar 2017g.) 
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At the Supervised automatic moves –level the remote operator supervises automated 
operation in the stacking area consisting of all hoist, gantry and trolley movements but 
executes the truck lane operations remotely using the remote control desk and the pro-
vided camera views. (Kalmar 2017g.) 
 
Automatic pick and place on stack means that the hoist and trolley movements are fully 
automated in the stacking area but the gantry movements are supervised by the operator. 
The operator still has to control the truck lane operations. (Kalmar 2017g.) 
 
The next level of automation is called automatic gantry. At this level all the movements 
done on the stacking area are fully automated and the operator has to do only the truck 
lane operations using the remote control desk. (Kalmar 2017g.) 
 
Fully automated level combines automated stacking area operations with automated 
truck lane operations. There is still need for remote operator when the automated system 
fails to execute the operation for some reason e.g. insufficient location data. This type of 
operator interaction is called exception handling. (Kalmar 2017g.) 
 
 
3.1.5 AutoRMG 
RMG crane or Rail Mounted Gantry crane is a very similar machine as the RTG crane. 
The biggest difference is that on RMG the gantry movement is done on rails instead of 
tyres. The operation done on the RMG crane is almost identical to the operation of RTG 
crane. The most differentiating feature of the Kalmar RMGs is the cantilevers illustrated 
in picture 11. The RMG can be delivered with either one or two cantilevers depending on 
the terminal layout. The cantilevers make the use of space more efficient since the truck 
lane is moved out from the area between the cranes “legs” thus making it possible to fill 
that area with containers. (Kalmar 2017h.) 
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PICTURE 11. Rail mounted gantry crane with cantilevers. (Konecranes 2018b.) 
 
 
3.2 Teleoperation 
 
 
3.2.1 General 
 
In addition to getting familiar with the machinery, it was also important to study the basics 
of teleoperation before starting the safety work on the remote operation station. The safety 
work would be done based on research of standards and studies on machine safety. Most 
of those would consider the machine as cabin controlled and adapting those to remote 
control would require detailed knowledge of remote operation and its characteristics. Not 
only the technical execution of control is different, but also the environment and the rel-
evance of the operator are completely different. Both of these play a major role in the 
safety of the operation. (Aalto University.) 
 
Remotely controlling machinery is probably most utilized in the field of robotics but in 
the most recent years it has come more and more popular in the heavy machinery also. 
The word teleoperation is defined as controlling a system over a distance. This distance 
can be anything from few millimeters up to millions of kilometers. There are a few dif-
ferent ways of how the controlling of the machinery can be done over a distance. (Aalto 
University.) 
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In remote operation the operator has a straight visual contact to the operated machine. 
The operating commands can be transferred to the machine electrically by wire or wire-
lessly. One example of this kind of teleoperation can be seen on picture 12. The operator 
is using a pendant controller to control the movements of a demolition robot based on the 
visual feedback he is getting. (Aalto University.) 
 
 
 PICTURE 12. The operator is operating the demolition robot remotely. (Konepörssi. 
2014.) 
 
Normal or standard teleoperation means that the operator controls the machine from a 
distance without a direct visual. The operator is executing the operating commands based 
on the visual feedback provided to him via camera. For example, terminal cranes are op-
erated this way. (Aalto University.)  
 
Teleoperation does not necessarily mean that the operating commands are constantly fed 
to the machine but it can also be supervisory control. In supervisory control, the onboard 
automation of the machine executes most of the operating commands and human interac-
tion is needed only in situations where the automation cannot handle the task in hand. 
(Aalto University.) 
 
 
3.2.2 Telepresence  
 
Situational awareness is usually compromised when teleoperating thus generating prob-
lems regarding the safety of the operation. This can be quickly demonstrated with a little 
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mind game; let’s think about a rock that is thrown towards a person’s head. The moment 
the person sees this object on a collision course to his forehead he/she blinks or moves 
his head. If this person is controlling a terminal crane via remote operation controller 
relying on the visuals provided through cameras and monitors when he sees an oncoming 
collision, does he take the appropriate action to evade this collision by reflex? (Sheridan 
1992, 4.)  
 
Thomas B. Sheridan, professor of mechanical engineering and Applied Psychology 
Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, defines telepresence as “sense of 
being physically present with virtual object(s) at the remote teleoperator site”. He also 
defines virtual presence as “sense of being physically present with visual, auditory or 
force displays generated by a computer”. These terms and their relation is illustrated in 
picture 13. (Sheridan 1992, 1.) 
 
 
PICTURE 13. The operator creates a mental model of him/herself being present in the 
actual environment of the machine he/she is controlling. The virtual presence on the other 
hand means that the operator feels he/she is present at the environment created by the 
computer software. (Sheridan 1992, 2.) 
 
According to Sheridan, the interfaces supporting the telepresence allegedly have an im-
proving effect on the sensorimotor and cognitive performance of the operator. Defining 
the presence or telepresence is problematic thus making it difficult to improve them by 
the design of the interface. Sheridan proposes that the feeling of presence is mostly af-
fected by three independent variables: extent of sensory information, control of relation 
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of sensors to environment and the ability to modify physical environment. The extent of 
sensory information can be seen as range of bits of information provided to the operator 
related to the task in hand. Control of relation of sensors to environment means that 
the operator has a chance of modifying his viewpoint.The ability to modify physical 
environment can be seen as a possibility of actually modifying the objects in his view or 
their relation to others. (Sheridan 1992, 2-4.) 
 
Sheridan illustrates these three variables as three orthogonal vectors as seen in picture 14. 
The greatest feeling of presence would be the combination of the maximum of all these. 
It should be noted that this is a very simplified illustration and the actual feeling of pres-
ence is not a simple sum of these three independent variables. (Sheridan 1992, 2-4.) More 
on how the safety work on Kalmar’s renewed remote control station took into considera-
tion the enhanced feeling of presence on chapter 4.2. 
 
 
PICTURE 14. Three variables of presence (Sheridan 1992, 5) 
 
 
3.2.3 Wireless control 
 
Wireless control is becoming more and more popular method of remotely controlling ma-
chinery. Cableless or wireless control can be simply defined as transmitting the operator’s 
commands to the machine without wired connection. Cableless control system in the 
other hand is a system, which has at least one remote station, one base station and a wire-
less transfer of data between them. Functional parts of the cableless control system are 
illustrated on the block diagram at picture 15. The block diagram also illustrates how the 
cableless control system interacts with the machine’s control system. (IEC 2017, 6-9.) 
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PICTURE 15. Functional parts of cableless control system (IEC 2017, 12). 
 
The operator is interfering with the control system via remote station. The transmitter is 
sending the information to the receiver at a base station. The term base station generally 
refers to a part of a cableless control system, which communicates with the machine con-
trol system. For example, the data transferred via cableless control system can be operat-
ing commands or error codes. (IEC 2017, 9-11.) Standards define several specific safety 
requirements regarding the cableless control of machinery. More on how these require-
ments were utilized in the safety work of the remote operation station on chapter 3.3.4.  
 
 
3.2.4 Remote operation of terminal equipment 
 
Remote operation is constantly taking more and more space in the container terminals. 
The increased level of automation has decreased the need of human intervention as most 
of the cranes operations is controlled by automation. The main tasks left for the operator 
are supervising the movements of the crane and so called exception handling. Exception 
handling means situations where the task in hand can’t be done automatically. Reason for 
this can vary a lot. At some situations automation system cannot reach  an adequate level 
of safety and human supervision or control is required. The need for exception handling 
can also arise from a failure in the automation system. For example, a thick layer of snow 
on top of a container can cause the automation system to fail to recognize the profile of 
the container thus giving the task to human operator. (ABB. 2018a) 
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The remote operators supervise and control the crane based on the video views provided 
to the remote control station. The design and video views of Kalmar’s current remote 
control desk can be seen in picture 16. It should be noted that in this picture the views on 
the screens are created by a computer-based simulator, not an actual camera on the site. 
The benefits of remote operation can be clearly identified. The viewing-areas of the op-
erator are significantly improved because the on-board cameras can be situated into places 
out of sight of the operator in the cabin. In addition, the operator is provided with sensor 
information of the height and speed of the machine. A variety of different kinds of equip-
ment can be operated from the same desk making the operation more flexible. Safety of 
the operation is also increased when the operator is moved away from the machinery. 
(ABB. 2018a) 
 
 
PICTURE 16. Kalmar’s design of the remote control desk. (Kalmar. 2015b.) 
 
One of the core benefits of remote operation is moving the operator from the cabin to the 
operating room. According to ABB, a manufacturer of ROS, bringing the whole team of 
terminal professionals together results in enhanced collaboration and team spirit. This is 
known to promote well-being at work. With remote operation the costs of transporting 
the operators to the machinery as well as costs of their working clothes and gear can be 
reduced. (Henriksson.) 
 
The control rooms are typically situated within the terminal premises even though the 
idea of a one global operating room is not new. The most limiting factor of the location 
of control room is the safety classified communication. The terminal crane has a ton of 
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safety rated functionality, such as the emergency stop function. According to Fredrik Jo-
hansson, marketing and sales manager at ABB Crane Systems, the communication be-
tween cranes and remote operation stations is done on terminal operators own communi-
cation network. This way all the components in the network and their performance and 
quality is known. The speed of the network and the time in which the operator’s com-
mands reach the cranes control systems can be defined accurately. Transmitting the video 
streams from the cranes on-board cameras in real time requires a huge amount of network 
capacity. These elements make it reasonable to keep the operation within a relatively 
close distance to the terminal operations. (Johansson 2015.) 
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4  REMOTE OPERATION STATION SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
4.1 General 
 
Determination of the safety requirements for the remote operation station was carried out 
based on broad research over the machinery standards and studies. At the very beginning 
of the project, user experience was recognized as one of the most highlighted aspects of 
the renewal. The affect that user experience has on safety of operation was not that obvi-
ous at the beginning of the project but it constantly popped up during the research work. 
One significant research illustrated the fact that user experience might actually be one of 
the most important ways of improving the safety of remote operation. The case study on 
remotely controlling CHE, made by Hannu Karvonen, Hanna Koskinen and Helena Tok-
konen, highlighted the UX issues related to the user experience of remote control stations. 
This study raised an interest towards user experience and the possibilities of increasing 
alertness of the operator and thus improving the safety of operation significantly. Unfor-
tunately, very little information was found on the effects that human performance has on 
the safety of machinery operation.  
 
Discovering Robert B. Sheridan’s theories of telepresence steered the research work more 
towards articles and studies on psychology. It became evident that enhanced sense of 
presence results in enhanced sensorimotor performance of the operator. This helped to 
understand that the solutions for improving the safety of operation were not exclusively 
connected to remote operation. The solutions or aspects making the environment more 
immersive would be more or less the same whether the human was remotely operating a 
container crane or watching a movie in a theatre. The research was expanded outside the 
machine industry. The concept of presence did not seem to be very well covered by the 
psychological research either. Finding proven techniques for improving the sense of pres-
ence required even more digging. By combining the findings of different studies with 
known technical solutions, it was still possible to define how the design of the ROS could 
improve the sense of presence. Findings concerning the user experience are explained in 
more detail at chapter 4.2. 
 
Research on the standards was relatively straight forward. Most of the standards ad-
dressed cabin controlled cranes but the safety requirements could be adapted to the remote 
28 
 
operation. Usually standards do not give a direct guidance or requirements for the design 
of the system. Defining the standard based safety requirements for the ROS required a lot 
of interpretation. Identifying the relative standards was done based on the knowledge of 
the operation and the hierarchy of standards. Chapter 4.3 of this thesis introduces the 
interpretations and requirements arising from the standards.  
 
Defining the safety requirements should involve opinions of several people in order to 
recognize all the possible risks and hazards. This was executed during this project by 
consulting other safety engineers working for Kalmar but also by getting familiar with 
literature on machine safety. Chapter 4.4 introduces safety requirements defined based on 
interpretations of standards found on literature.  
 
 
4.2 User experience 
 
 
4.2.1 General 
 
Manually driving a container crane is a very immersive experience. The operator is at the 
heart of the operation feeling every little vibration the machine is creating. According to 
surveys, the operators rely heavily on visual and audible signals whilst operating the 
crane. All this is taken away when the operator is moved from the cabin to an office 
environment in front of remote control desk. The office environment can be very passive 
providing very little feedback on the actual behavior of the machine. It is actually pretty 
much the opposite. Audible signals, which have nothing to do with the operation, become 
highlighted and the operator’s concentration is taken away from the monitors. Many of 
the safety features of remote control heavily rely on the observations made by the opera-
tor. For example, the operator has responsibility of noticing a hazardous situation within 
the camera views and act accordingly to avoid the accident. The operator is also provided 
with alerts or warnings and it is crucial that the operator spots them. In addition, the find-
ings of Robert B. Sheridan support the importance of user experience for the safety of 
operation.  
 
Some studies have been made regarding the user experience of remotely operating con-
tainer cranes. According to the study made by Hanna Koskinen, Hannu Karvonen and 
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Helena Tokkonen, a few fundamental targets for achieving a greater user experience in 
remote operation are identified. Sense of control and feeling of presence were recognized 
as the most important factors. Sense of control is closely connected to the feeling of safe 
operation. The operators are familiar with the fact that the cranes can cause a severe ac-
cident in just seconds if the operator makes a mistake. (Karvonen, Koskinen, Tokkonen 
2013.) The feeling of safe operation is fundamentally important for the wellbeing of the 
operator.  
 
Psychologist Abraham Maslow researched the subject of human motivation in the 1940s 
and came up with a theory, which stated that people are motivated to achieve certain 
fundamental needs. Maslow created a hierarchy of needs illustrated in picture 17. Ac-
cording to Maslow, the needs have a certain hierarchy. This means that people would 
have to satisfy the lower degree needs before being able to climb up the pyramid towards 
the satisfaction of higher needs. This way any failure of meeting the lower needs would 
also mean the failure of meeting the higher needs. (McLeod 2017) 
 
PICURE 17. Abraham Maslow stated that human needs have a certain hierarchy (McLeod 
2017). 
 
As seen in the Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, the safety needs are amongst the very basic 
needs at the lower section of the pyramid. The safety needs consist of such aspects of life 
as protection from elements and laws but also freedom of fear. (McLeod 2017.) The hi-
erarchy of needs is originally a theory in psychology but it can give significant support 
for the evaluation of design aspects of the ROS.  For instance, the design of the ROS 
should include a broad enough video view of the cranes environment. This way enabling 
the operator to evaluate the effects of the cranes movements. According to the study made 
by Karvonen, Koskinen and Tokkonen, the perception of kinetics is also crucial to the 
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feeling of safe operation. The user interface of the remote operation station could support 
this by providing a clear indication of the cranes speed and direction. The information of 
the kinetics should also include the crane’s load. The operator should get information of 
the current hoist height and the weight of the load to feel more in control of the operation. 
(Karvonen, Koskinen, Tokkonen 2013.) 
 
 
4.2.2 Feeling of presence 
 
The causal connection between feeling of presence and the safety of remote operation has 
already been introduced in chapters 3.2.2 and 4.2. This clause focuses on the design so-
lutions by which the feeling of presence could be improved. Probably the most important 
and the easiest way of increasing the sense of presence is by the amount of sensory infor-
mation provided for the operator. It is generally believed that the greater the number of 
simulated human senses, the greater the feeling of presence. Studies have reported that 
interaction with a device providing audio-visual information creates far greater social 
presence than the one providing only audio information. With the current technology, 
creating information, which simulates body movements would be possible but it has been 
noted that the feeling of presence is greatly dominated by the visual and aural information. 
(Ditton & Lombard 1997.) Remote operators are currently provided with only visual in-
formation of the crane and its surroundings. Implementing audible information should be 
considered as a design factor at the renewal of the remote operation desk. This would 
require further studies on the scope of the audio signals provided for the operator. Cap-
turing the complete audible environment of the terminal would not necessarily be the 
most optimal solution. Distracting noise should be cancelled the same way as in the cabin 
environment.  
 
As mentioned above, the visual information has a huge effect on the sense of presence 
and many qualities of the video stream can be used for enhancing the sense of presence. 
Image quality, consisting of resolution and sharpness of the image, has a proven effect on 
the immersion of the situation. This has been studied in video conferences. The reports 
show that high-resolution video created a feeling of communicative presence for the par-
ticipants of the conference. (Ditton & Lombard 1997.) 
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In addition, the size of the image has a reported effect on the sense of presence. The effect 
of the image size has been researched a lot. One great example is the so called motion 
sickness study made by D. M. Parker in 1971 and its follow-up study made in 1975. 
During the test, subjects were shown a few minutes video of car driving shot from the 
driver’s point of view. Many of the subjects reported severe nausea. During the follow-
up study, the subjects were shown the same video but this time on a significantly smaller 
screen. Subjects’ reaction was reportedly far less severe. Similar kind of research was 
conducted in 1995 when subjects were shown video scenes both on 46 inch and 12 inch 
screen. The subjects who watched the videos from larger screen reported more “sense of 
movement” and “sense of participation”. Closely related to the image size, is the viewing 
angle. According to some studies, the image size itself may not be the fundamental factor 
in boosting the sense of presence but the viewing angle. The effect that a large picture has 
on the proportion of visual field can be achieved also with a small screen and small view-
ing distance, similar way as in virtual reality glasses where the screen is placed just a few 
centimeters from the person’s eyes. It has been suggested that the small screen and small 
distance would actually create a stronger sensation of reality. (Ditton & Lombard 1997.)  
 
Video screens are the most important way of delivering information of the cranes status 
and the biggest single factor affecting the sense of presence the operator is feeling. How-
ever, the video quality is limited by the time required for the data transmission between 
the cameras and the remote operating station as described in chapter 3.2.4. The proportion 
of visual field can be modified with the design of the desk. Enlarging the screen size has 
some limitations too. The screens should be small enough for the operator to see the whole 
screen without constantly lowering and raising his head. The screens should be situated 
similar way as in picture 18 creating a bit like a curve around the operator making the 
proportion of field larger and the situation more immersive.  
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PICTURE 18. The screens should be mounted on a slight angle to expand the field of 
vision (Siemens 2018.). 
 
Even though the visual information is the dominant stimulation for the operator, the pos-
sibilities of audible signals should be researched and evaluated, especially because the 
current design of the remote operation station does not support audible information. The 
two most important characteristics of sound are quality and dimensionality. When re-
searching the effects of image quality, it became evident that the better the quality the 
greater the sense of presence. However, in the audible signals the research findings are 
diverged. Studies show that generally the high quality sounds are more realistic but the 
lower quality sounds are found more immersive. The effect of three-dimensional sound 
on the sense of presence has also been researched. The results are again mixed. Some 
studies show no difference between monaural and dimensional sounds yet some studies 
show that multi-speaker systems create higher feeling of presence than the single speaker 
ones. Despite the lack of research results, it is still believed that dimensional sound creates 
greater sense of presence. The volume of the sound can also have an effect on the sense 
of presence. Very low and very high volumes are seen as unrealistic and these should be 
avoided. (Ditton & Lombard 1997.) 
 
Ways of improving the immersiveness of remote operation are not limited to the infor-
mation provided to the operator. According to researches, the feeling of presence is af-
fected by the interactivity of the operation. Meaning how easily the operator can alternate 
the virtual environment. The interactivity of the operation can be affected by the number 
of inputs the operator has on the system. These inputs can be voice commands or haptic 
inputs delivered via buttons or touch screens. The effect of each input channel is yet to 
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be studied but it is generally believed that those have a significant effect on the 
telepresence. (Ditton & Lombard 1997.) 
 
The interactivity of the operation is closely connected to theories of Robert B. Sheridan 
introduced in chapter 3.2.2. Sheridan stated that one of the most important characteristics 
of telepresence is the user’s ability to modify his environment (Sheridan, 1992 2-4). Mod-
ifying the environment can be done in several different ways. For example, the user can 
have a possibility of rearranging the objects presented in the virtual environment or a 
possibility to change the color or size of the objects. One way of modifying the environ-
ment is also by alternating the point of view the operator has on the virtual environment. 
This would result in similar effect that turning head has on the real world. Interaction with 
the virtual environment should still be as natural as possible and the environment should 
respond to the user inputs without any lag. (Ditton & Lombard 1997.) 
 
Similar themes arose during the case study made by Karvonen, Koskinen and Tokkonen. 
For the operator, the possibility of manually adjusting the operating view was seen as a 
significant aspect of the user experience. The ROS should also support the co-operation 
between the remote operator and the yard personnel. Communication should be natural 
and effortless. (Karvonen, Koskinen, Tokkonen 2013.) These being just a few examples 
but showing a great correspondence between the psychological studies and real life ob-
servations, all supporting the assumption of the importance of user experience to the em-
ployee well-being.  
 
The user experience unquestionably has a huge effect on the employee well-being and 
the operator’s concentration on the work in hand. Operating any kind of machinery de-
mands a huge amount of skill and effort from the operator. Studies show that lack of sleep 
results in significant drop of humans’ sensorimotor and cognitive performance (Feyer & 
Williamson 2000, 649). It is hard to imagine why general lack of concentration and bore-
dom would not have similar kinds of effects on the performance of the remote operator. 
Improving the sense of presence has some major technical limitations, for example the 
data transfer and the camera technology, but some improvements can be made relatively 
easily. The safety analysis made for the Kalmar’s new remote operation station took into 
consideration the safety aspects of the remote operation station and risk analysis were 
made to cover the risks generated by the operator’s lack of concentration.  
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4.3 Standards 
 
 
4.3.1 EN 13557:2008 
 
Standard EN 13557 covers the control stations and controls of cranes. Standard is mainly 
made for cabin-controlled cranes but it can also be applied to the design of remote control 
stations. This clause deals with the relevant safety requirements, which were recognized 
during the safety work on the renewal of Kalmar’s remote operation station. 
 
The standard contains a table of significant hazards identified with the controls and con-
trol stations of cranes. This table was used as guidance whilst working on the hazard 
analysis in appendix 1 and appendix 2. The hazardous situations and events resulted by 
these hazards are described in the hazard analysis as well as possible mitigation methods 
for each individual hazard. (SIS 2008, 7-10) 
 
The standard introduces safety requirements for the controllers, cabins and consoles of 
the control stations. The requirements set for the controllers aim to prevent unintentional 
operating commands. The movement of the control levers should be consistent with the 
cranes motion. In addition, there should be fixed symbols near the control levers to indi-
cate the action triggered by the controller. The control levers themselves should be hold-
to-run type meaning that they return to neutral position when released. The standard also 
defines forces required to actuate certain controllers. Control lever’s forward or back-
wards movement should require the force between 5 to 60 Newton as the same figure for 
sideways movement is between 5 to 20 Newton. Forces required to activate push-buttons 
shall not exceed the value of 10 Newton but the standard does not define a minimum 
value which makes it possible to use touch screen for certain operations whilst still com-
plying with the standard. Some non-functional requirements are also set. Protection 
against electric shock should be designed as defined in EN 60204-32 and the temperature 
of the controller should remain below 43 degrees Celsius in any condition. (SIS 2008, 7-
10.) Requirements set for pedals and hand-driven movements are not valid within the 
scope of the remote operation station.  
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The requirements set for the cabins of the cranes are mostly not valid when designing an 
ROS for office environment. Still some requirements set for cabin can be used as instruc-
tions for the recommended working conditions of the operators. Such requirements are 
the free standing height of 2 meters and the requirements of the cabins climate. The stand-
ard states that the operating temperature should be above 18 degrees Celsius but under 30 
degrees Celsius within the limits of external climate conditions. The operator should be 
provided with an adjustable seat. (SIS 2008, 12-15.) These requirements are not relevant 
considering the physical design of the remote operation station but have a significant ef-
fect on the well-being and thus concentration of the operator. Even though the design of 
the station cannot address these issues it is possible to include instructions of the preferred 
working environment with the station. 
 
Standard also defines the safety critical aspects of the design of the console itself. Again 
the requirements are mostly set to prevent unintentional operating commands made by 
the operator. Controls and their surroundings should be designed so that they can be ac-
tivated only as a result of intentional operation. The standard gives examples on how this 
requirement can be met. Such design features are recessing the actuator and surrounding 
the control levers on a panel by a guard rail. The most usable solution for avoiding unin-
tentional usage is probably free space around the controller. Free space between rows of 
push-buttons should be at least 10 mm and at least 15 mm between separate push-buttons. 
The free space of 5mm is seen adequate for push-buttons which don’t operate any move-
ment of the crane or its lifting accessories. Each crane console should  have a controller 
for acoustic warning device located in the crane. The controller should be different from 
the cranes operating controllers. (SIS 2008, 15-16.) The remote operation station is not 
machine specific meaning that each crane can be operated via several different control 
stations. According to EN 13357 measures should be taken to make sure that only one 
console is active at a time, except for the emergency stop function. The standard does not 
define more closely the measures that should or could be used. (SIS 2008, 16.) 
 
 
4.3.2 EN 60204-32 
 
EN 60204 is a standard defining safety critical aspects and requirements of the electrical 
equipment of machinery. Part 32 of this standard includes particular requirements for 
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hoisting machines. Defining the requirements related to the remote control station re-
quired a lot of interpretation and research. Requirements defined based on EN 60204 were 
closely related to the physical design of the desk’s structure.  
 
The remote control station is an electric device and it should fulfill the required protection 
methods to protect the user from electric shock in the event of failure. Adequate protec-
tion methods are introduced and covered by the standard and detailed itemization of them 
is not in the scope of this thesis. The safety work defines the electric design to be done 
according to the standard but yet the detailed itemization is not rational.  
 
However, few distinct requirements were identified from the standard with a close con-
nection to the remote operation. Colors of push-buttons and indicator as well as illumi-
nated push-buttons are defined in EN 60204-32. Requirements for push-button actuators 
are illustrated in picture 19 and requirements for indicator lights are illustrated in picture 
20. 
 
 
PICTURE 19. Desired colors for push-buttons (CENELEC 2008, 68). 
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PICTURE 20. Desired colors of indicator lights (CENELEC 2008, 69). 
 
The standard also obligates to take protective measures in such applications where the 
malfunction of an electronic device could lead to a hazardous situation. It should be noted 
that the standard obligates to take measures to minimize the risk of the occurrence of such 
failure. This means that emergency stop device is not adequate enough since it does not 
affect the risk of the component failure by any means. The standard gives some examples 
for reducing the risk, one of them being the use of redundant signals. (CENELEC 2008, 
62-63.) The movement controlling joysticks were recognized as such devices. Failure in 
the joysticks could result in unintentional operating moves, such as the crane moving to 
different direction than intended by the operator. Based on the standard the joysticks used 
in the ROS should be equipped with redundant signals.  
 
 
4.3.3 IEC 62745 
 
IEC 62745 was launched in 2017 and it is the first machine safety standard specialized in 
cableless control of machinery. The standard defines general safety requirements for the 
safety of wirelessly transmitting control data between the controller and machine’s 
onboard control system. This section of the thesis does not introduce all the safety re-
quirements set by standard but focuses on the most relevant ones. It should still be noted 
that the design of the remote control station should meet all the requirements if it is used 
as a cableless control device.  
 
The standards requires that measures are taken in order to prevent unintentional or un-
authorized operating commands. For example, commands resulting from dropping the 
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controller to the floor should be prevented if such a scenario is possible. Again, the stand-
ard does not provide specific solutions to be used for protection but it gives examples. 
The standard suggests that unauthorized use could be prevented by using a key-operated 
switch or an access code to power up the transmission of data. Similar kind of suggestions 
are given for ensuring that the operating commands only affect the intended base station 
and that the operating commands initiate only the intended function. The standard also 
sets technical requirements for the serial data transfer and the interruption and establish-
ment of the communication. (IEC 2017, 12-14.) These requirements should be followed 
during the design of the remote control device. 
 
IEC 62745 requires that the cableless control device is equipped with automatic stop 
function and at least one additional safety rated stop function, which is initiated by a 
human action and by using a dedicated controller on the control device. The different stop 
functions and their characteristics are introduced in picture 21. (IEC 2017, 14.) 
 
 
PICTURE 21. Stop functions of cableless control system (IEC 2017, 15). 
 
Control stop refers to a stop function which is manually controlled by the operator. The 
control stop function is only active when the cableless control station is in control of the 
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machine. The control stop function should be engineered in accordance with IEC 60204-
1. 
General safe stop is a safety related stopping function and initiating it should result in 
OFF-state of all the safety-related outputs at the base station. After actuating the general 
safe stop controller it shall not automatically return to un-activated state. Disengagement 
of the general safe stop controller shall only be possible by intentional manual action 
delivered from the remote station. The controller for the general safe stop function should 
have a direct opening action in accordance with IEC 60947-5-1. 
 
Emergency stop function shall meet the requirements of the general safe stop and it has 
some additional requirements. The actuator shall be marked as an emergency stop device 
and comply with the relevant standards and fulfill the requirements of ISO 13850. Acti-
vation must result in OFF-state of all the safety-related outputs at the base station and the 
function must be operational at all times. The information of use shall also instruct that 
the system integrator takes responsibility of making sure that the requirements are met 
when incorporating the cableless control system to the machines control system. If mul-
tiple cableless control stations are simultaneously communicating with the base station, 
the disabling of any of the remote stations shall initiate automatic stop function. 
 
Automatic stop function is a safety-related control function, which initiates an OFF-state 
of safety related outputs at base station. The automatic stop function is automatically in-
itiated under certain conditions which could result in hazardous state of the connected 
machinery. Automatic stop function is initiated when transmission ceases, when a fault 
in safety-related part of cableless control system is detected or when no valid signal is 
detected within the determined time. This time is declared by the manufacturer of the 
cableless control system but it can’t be more than 500 milliseconds. It should be noted 
that these are the absolute minimum requirements for the conditions under which the au-
tomatic stop function shall be initiated. The manufacturer can engineer the automatic stop 
function to initiate under the additional conditions determined by the hazard analyses. 
(IEC 2017, 15-17.) 
 
Resetting after general safe stop or emergency stop shall require a deliberate action from 
the operator. The resetting function can be done only from the remote station from which 
the stop function has been initiated. If disengagement of the general safe stop or emer-
gency stop controller results in communication between cableless control station and the 
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base station, it should be closely evaluated if there is a need for additional manual reset 
at the remote station. The risk assessment and hazard analyses shall provide such infor-
mation. (IEC 2017, 17.)  
 
In addition, the standard sets requirements for configurability protection, behavior on loss 
of supply and latching control functions. These requirements need to be reviewed and 
studied whilst making risk analyses for cablelessly controlled machinery.  
 
 
4.3.4 EN 13850 
 
EN 13850 is a standard defining the technical features of emergency stop function. This 
chapter introduces the requirements set for the span of control of emergency stop function 
and the requirements set for the controller of the emergency stop function. The emergency 
stop function shall be operative at all times and override all other operating functions. 
When emergency stop function is activated it shall remain activated until it is manually 
reset and start commands shall not be effective while the emergency stop function is ac-
tivated. The span of control of the emergency stop function shall cover the whole ma-
chine. Exception to this can be made when stopping all linked machinery would create 
additional hazard or affect unnecessarily to production. Span of controls of each separate 
emergency stop function may overlap. (SIS 2015, 3-5.) The concept of span of control is 
demonstrated in picture 22.  
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PICTURE 22. Demonstration of span of control. (SIS 2015, 5.) 
 
The emergency stop device shall be designed so that it is easily identified and actuated. 
The device shall be handle, wire, rope, bar, foot-pedal or a push-button actuated with a 
palm. The device itself has to be colored red and the possible background of it yellow. 
The device or the background should not be labelled with either text or a symbol. Elec-
trical emergency stop devices shall have a direct opening action and they shall be me-
chanically latching. The stop command must be delivered even in case of malfunction of 
the latching functionality. Using the emergency stop device in a cableless or portable 
controller brings some additional requirements. The machine should always have at least 
one emergency stop device permanently attached on the machine. The confusion between 
active and inactive devices has to be prevented. This can be done by illuminating the 
active device, automatically covering the inactive emergency stop device or by storage of 
the detached cableless controller so that there is no risk of confusion. (SIS 2015, 6-8.) 
 
 
4.4 Human behavior 
 
As described earlier the human operator can have a huge effect on the safety of the oper-
ation. The role and effect of the human operator on the system can vary depending on the 
automation level of the machinery. ROS can be classified into category where the electric 
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system is concerned as a remote control system. The operator provides inputs to the sys-
tem and the control system operates the actuators accordingly. The relationship between 
operator and equipment under control is illustrated in picture 23. (Carey 2001, 26-27.) 
 
PICTURE 23. Relationship between operator and equipment in remote operation (Carey 
2001, 26). 
 
In this case, the operator is fully in control of the machine and performs a safety-related 
function such as pressing the emergency stop actuator. The operator input will be critical 
when safety is concerned and special consideration should be given into the design of the 
input device especially into location ad characteristics of the control device. The electrical 
control system will support the safety of operation. The more critical the operation is the 
higher the required quality of human factors. The risk analysis should identify the human-
dependent safety functions. (Carey 2001, 27.) 
 
In order to analyze how human behavior can influence risk and how the design of the 
system can address those, few objectives have to be understood: 
 How a human can cause or contribute a hazardous situation 
 What safety functions require human interference 
 Required integrity of the system (Carey 2001, 33.) 
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The analysis of human factors requires an additional analysis to be made alongside the 
“normal” integrity analysis for hardware and software. The purpose of this kind of anal-
ysis is to recognize and determine what needs to be done on the design of the hardware 
and software to make sure that they support the human safety integrity. (Carey 2001, 33-
34.) The process is outlined in picture 24. 
 
 
 
PICTURE 24. Determining the human safety factors (Carey 2001, 34). 
 
According to the table in picture 24 the required level of integrity of human safety func-
tion can’t be achieved only by technical aspects but also people and processes must be 
considered. Unfortunately, current standards focus mainly on the requirements of hard-
ware and software. The framework made by Amey Vectra Limited gives advice on how 
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to include the human factor issues in the risk and hazard analysis. The consequence of the 
event will determine how detailed the analysis should be. For example, if the hazardous 
situation would lead to major injuries and fatalities, the human reliability analysis should 
include a detailed level analysis on operational tasks, modelling of risks arising from hu-
man error and human failure considered within main top-down system hazard identifica-
tion process. The advice are listed based on the consequences on table at picture 25. The 
examples are intended to be only illustrative. (Carey 2001, 35.) 
 
 
PICTURE 25. Human reliability analysis requirements (Carey 2001, 35). 
 
The study made by Amey Vectra Limited also proposes how the design could take into 
consideration the human factors. The proposal is illustrated at SIL 1, SIL 2 and SIL3 in 
pictures 26-28. The proposal links requirements for human factor design to the integrity 
level of the electrical system. In these examples the requirements for human factor design 
amplify when the SIL level of the system increases. This is again just an illustrative ex-
ample of the execution. (Carey 2001, 37-38.) 
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PICTURE 26. Proposed requirements of human factors at SIL 1 system (Carey 2001, 38). 
 
 
PICTURE 27. Proposed requirements of human factors at SIL 2 system (Carey 2001, 39). 
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PICTURE 28. Proposed requirements of human factors at SIL 3 system (Carey 2001, 39-
40). 
 
The human factors should definitely be included in the risk analysis especially in such a 
system as remote operation station. However, no clear instructions on how this should be 
done exists.  
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4.5 Other 
 
Tapio Siirilä, a well-known machine safety expert, has written several books around the 
topic of implementing machine safety requirements to practice. Siirilä’s literature was 
researched within the safety work on Kalmar’s remote operation station and relevant re-
quirements were adopted. Many of Siirilä’s opinions had already come up during the re-
search on standards and studies but Siirilä’s literature provided ways on preventing unin-
tentional operating commands, which were seen as one of the most likely hazards already 
during the preliminary hazard analysis. The preliminary hazard analysis is introduced in 
chapter 5. 
 
The controllers must be designed in a way that they are activated only intentionally. Un-
intentionally activating a controller can create a hazardous situation when a human is near 
the machine and it unexpectedly starts up or changes the direction of movement or speed. 
There are several ways on executing the prevention of unintentional operating commands. 
Listed below are few known ways. 
 
 The speed-area of the machine can be changed only from a standstill. 
 The protection of sensor and the control system have to be designed in a way that 
the sensor can’t be accidentally affected or that affecting won’t have an effect on 
the machine. 
 Use of two-hand controllers 
 Prevention of operating commands resulting from dropping portable pendants. 
 Protecting the control devices so that accidentally leaning on them won’t activate 
the controller. This can be done by protecting the controllers with lids or collars 
or by mounting them on their surroundings. (Siirilä 2009, 242-243.) 
 
The renewed RC desk was planned to include a touch-screen used to control some oper-
ations of the connected crane. Touch-screen is considered as a multifunctional operating 
device and the risk of unintentional operating commands is significantly higher compared 
to the controllers which are used always for activating the same operation. Unintentional 
operating commands can be minimized by using a so called double-actuation. The first 
activation of the icon on the touch-screen brings up a pop-up window or similar indicator, 
which has information on the operation to be activated. The operator has to touch or click 
the icon again to actually activate the operation. The second activation doesn’t necessarily 
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have to be done on the same control device as long as it requires a deliberate effort from 
the operator. (Siirilä 2009, 242-246.) This type of activation was analyzed as very frus-
trating for the operator. Many operations which were planned on being activated from the 
touch-screen were not safety-critical.  In addition, the onboard control system of machin-
ery has safety functions preventing hazardous situations resulting from unintentional op-
eration commands. In such cases, the double activation was seen unnecessary. The oper-
ating commands requiring a double activation were determined during the operational 
hazard analysis, which is introduced in chapter 5.  
 
Unintentional operating commands can be made even less likely by clearly indicating the 
functionality of control levers. This can be quite tricky when the control station is portable 
or there is no visual contact to the machine being operated and the machines positon re-
lated to the operator can vary. In these situations such labeling as right, left, up and down 
is not adequate for safe operation. The direction of movement should be indicated by 
well-known symbols. The functionality of controller should be designed in a way that 
they are used naturally and inherently as intended. For example, increasing the speed 
should be done by moving the controller right or forward, not the opposite way. Multi-
functional control devices should be used only for non-hazardous operation. (Siirilä 2009, 
242-246.) 
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5 HAZARD ANALYSIS 
 
 
5.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
 
 
5.1.1 General  
 
Preliminary hazard analysis is used for identifying possible safety critical areas of the 
process or product at the very early phase of the development. In addition to identifying 
the possible hazards the PHA also gives recommendations on risk mitigation methods. 
The PHA is sometimes described as the most important analysis of the system safety 
process since it is the first analysis on the process under development. Target for the 
analysis is to isolate the possible hazardous areas in the design and figure out the need for 
further analysis. In order to complete the analysis, the safety engineer needs detailed in-
formation of the product under development. The data should include at least the follow-
ing information: 
 Scope of the product 
 Environment in which the product will be used 
 Hardware to be used with the product 
 End use of the product. (Vincoli 2014, 71-72.) 
 
The analysis can be done using a dedicated worksheet. One example of such worksheet 
is illustrated in picture 29. The content of the worksheet can vary depending on the or-
ganization or the product but the worksheet in picture 29 illustrates the relevant aspects, 
which are addressed in preliminary hazard analysis.  
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PICTURE 29. Example of PHA worksheet (Vincoli 2014, 75). 
 
The analysis should answer to a few specific questions. Some of these questions may 
seem obvious but the analysis should still include an answer to those to make sure that 
the analysis is complete. These questions include 
 
 What is the analyzed system? 
 Are people involved? 
 What is the functionality of the system? 
 What the system should not do? 
 What are the relevant standards? 
 Has the system been used before? 
 What does the system produce? 
 What elements are the input to the system? 
 What elements are the output of the system? 
 What could cause a hazard? 
 What are the energy sources? 
 Is timing critical for safety of the operation? 
 What are the inherent generic hazards in the system? 
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 How could control of the system be improved? (Vincoli 2014, 77-78.) 
 
After the analysis, a report should be written. In addition to the worksheet, the report 
should include brief description of the system and recommendations of the following 
analyses. (Vincoli 2014, 77-78.) 
 
 
5.1.2 Preliminary hazard analysis for remote operation station 
 
The preliminary hazard analysis for common RC desk was done during the end of year 
2017. The scope of the analysis was to identify and mitigate key risks in planned usage 
of the RC desk. The analysis also covered requirements from relevant standards. The 
analysis was divided in different sections regarding the RC operation. The operation sec-
tion covered the risks identified to be present during handling of manual or automated 
equipment or inventory of container maps. The maintenance section covered the risk 
identified to be present during maintenance activities, such as stopping the machine for 
maintenance or driving it inside the segregated maintenance area. The standards section 
covered the safety requirements and risks set by the recognized and relevant standards. 
Different machine types were not addressed individually but the risks were recognized to 
be in general level and applicable to all types of machinery. For each identified hazard an 
ID of the hazard, risk proposed by the hazard and mitigation methods were recognized. 
The complete analysis is attached as a company confidential annex A of this thesis. Pic-
ture 30 illustrates one identified risk at the PHA.  
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PICTURE 30. Example of risk identification in PHA. 
 
The risk has been identified to arise from the lost connection between the desk and the 
machines onboard system. After losing the connection the machine could possibly con-
tinue its movement without the operator having control. This in the other hand could lead 
to a collision and possibly injuring people. The proposed mitigation method has been 
recognized from the standard IEC 62745, which is introduced in chapter 3.3.3. The desk 
shall have an automatic stop function, which stops the movement of the crane in the event 
of lost connection. The responsible party for this risk mitigation is the manufacturer of 
the device, in this case Kalmar.  
 
 
 
5.2 Operational Hazard Analysis 
 
 
5.2.1 General 
 
The operational hazard analysis or OHA is done after the preliminary hazard analysis. 
The purpose of it is to identify all the hazards, which are dangerous for humans and pro-
vide risk mitigation methods to minimize the identified risks. (Vincoli 2014, 99.) After 
the identification of the hazard, the risk related to it needs to be evaluated. The level of 
the risk is a combination of the severity of the consequences of the hazardous situation 
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and likelihood of the occurrence of the situation. Standards and handbooks provide sev-
eral different techniques for the risk estimation. Methods can vary a lot. For example, 
some can highlight human errors as some focus on the failures of technical components 
and devices. The estimation is always a subjective decision and can be highly affected by 
the personality of the estimator. The estimation of the level of the risk should not be main 
concern of the analysis but the most important thing is recognition of the hazards. (Siirilä 
2008, 95-96.) 
 
After the determination of the level of the risk, it has to be determined if the risk is toler-
able or not. Again, the standards and workbooks provide several different kinds of meth-
ods on determining whether the risk is tolerable or not. It should be noted that all the risks 
cannot be fully disposed and machines will always have risk factors. These risks should 
be documented and presented in the manuals. If the level of the risk is seen as unbearable, 
measures have to be taken to minimize the risk to an acceptable level. These mitigation 
methods are presented in the hazard analysis and the risk is estimated again post the mit-
igation methods. (Siirilä 2008, 107-112.) Literature, standards and accident reports pro-
vide guidance for determining the appropriate reduction methods.  
 
The risk analysis is a significant part of the designing the new machine or a retrofit and 
the analysis should always be properly documented. The standard SFS-EN ISO 14121-1 
requires that the documents of the analysis include the following information as far as 
suitable: 
 Information of the system in scope of the analysis; technical details, limits, in-
tended use etc.  
 Assumptions of the system; lifespan, strain, safety factors etc. 
 Recognized hazards, dangers and dangerous situations 
 Information of the references used to support the evaluation of the risk level 
 Targets of the risk reduction 
 Implemented risk reduction methods 
 Remaining risks 
 The outcome of the risk analysis 
 The documents, memos and other records made during the analysis process. (Si-
irilä 2008, 126.) 
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5.2.2 Operational hazard analysis for remote operation station 
 
The operational hazard analysis for Kalmar’s remote operation station was done during 
the spring of 2018. Focus on the assessment was to recognize all the hazards related to 
the remote operation desk. In other words, the risks which could be affected by the design 
of the desk. The hazards were addressed in different sections depending on the use case 
and the source of the hazard. Firstly, the analysis addressed general hazards which were 
present regardless of the type of the machine the desk is connected to. These hazards were 
divided to two different categories. 
 
Hazards related to the use of desk –section covered hazards which would result in harm 
to the operator himself. Such issues being the ergonomic design of the desk or protection 
against electrical faults. 
 
General RC operation hazards – section covered the operational risks which are com-
mon to all types of machinery. An example of such common hazard is the mode change 
of the controllers. If the functionality of the controllers changes in the middle of operation, 
without any input from the operator, the operator may accidentally perform a hazardous 
movement. More detailed example of such a situation is the mode change from supervised 
to watch mode. In supervised mode the operator is required to monitor the movements of 
the crane and keep the hold-to-run device activated. Releasing the actuator will result in 
stopping the movements of the machine. In watch mode the operator can watch the move-
ments of the crane but none of the controllers are active (except for the emergency stop). 
Now if the mode is changed automatically from the supervised mode to the watch mode 
the operator may get confused of the functionalities of the controllers since in supervised 
mode he can stop the crane by releasing the hold-to-run but in watch mode that is not 
possible anymore.  
 
Machine specific hazards were also analyzed within the operational hazard analysis. RC 
operation of each of the machine in the scope of the project was analyzed individually. 
The machines are introduced in the chapter 2.2. The operational hazard analysis process 
highlighted the importance of knowledge of machinery. It would have been practically 
impossible to complete the analysis without detailed information of the machinery and 
their operation. The hazards were further categorized depending on the source of the haz-
ard to make the analyzing work more detailed and systematic. 
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Container tip-over hazards -section covered the hazards resulting in containers being 
tip-over or shunted from the container stack. In such a situation the container could drop 
on top of a truck or a truck driver resulting in severe injury. For example, container tip-
over can happen if the trolley drive is started before the spreader is hoisted high enough. 
There are several methods on how this can be prevented but those are confidential and 
thus not introduced in this thesis. 
 
Gantry driving hazards –section covered the hazards related to the gantry movement of 
the operated machine. These hazards would result in crane colliding with CHE or terminal 
personnel. There are several reasons why the collision would happen and each of the 
sequence of events was analyzed individually. For example, such reasons would be the 
CHE being parked at the gantry drive path of the crane or the crane being driven out of 
the gantry drive path. The RC operator has a very limited vision on the actual site through 
the camera views and there is always some latency in the picture. This way the RC gantry 
driving is particularly dangerous and needed to be analyzed thoroughly.  
 
Interchange lane container handling hazards and Truck lifting hazards –sections 
covered the hazards present during the interchange lane operations. During the inter-
change lane operations, the spreader/container is being moved at a very close distance to 
humans. Even the slightest mistake or malfunction can result in a hazardous situation. For 
example, the operator usually uses micromovements for fine positioning of the container 
to the trailer. During the micromovements the range of motion and the speed of the crane 
is very limited. Now if the operator inadvertently activates gantry movement the cabin of 
the truck can be crushed by the spreader.  
 
Stacking area container handling hazards –section covered the hazards related to the 
container handling inside the stacking area. Normally people should be isolated from the 
stacking area but there is always a risk that personnel are inside the segregated area. These 
risks had to be taken into consideration and find the proper reduction methods. 
 
Reefer operation hazards –section covered the risks being present during the reefer op-
erations. Reefer racks are used to store reefer containers and have personnel to connect 
the power cables to reefer containers after those have landed. Generally colliding to the 
reefer rack would cause severe harm to the reefer personnel. In addition, the RC operator 
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may not be able to spot if the power cable is disconnected or not and hoist a connected 
container. This would possibly lead to electrocution of the reefer personnel. 
 
Block change hazards and Maintenance hazards –sections covered the risk related to 
block change and maintenance operations. These hazards do not necessarily originate 
from the RC operation but the operator may have an opportunity to avoid a hazardous 
situation if he operates correctly. One of the most important risk reduction methods is the 
proper training of the operators. 
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6 RESULTS 
 
The recognition of the safety requirements of remote control of container handling equip-
ment included a research on standards and studies. During the research, it became evident 
that the remote operation poses significant risks, which have to be addressed in the design 
of the remote control desk. The most significant risks were recognized to arise from the 
data transfer and unintentional operating commands. The risks related to the data transfer 
could be mitigated by complying with relevant standards. The already existing design of 
Kalmar’s remote control desk had safety features regarding the transfer of information 
between the desk and the machine. The prevention of unintended operating commands 
proved to be more complicated than first expected. Standards provided several technical 
solutions for this, such as free space between the controllers and minimum forces required 
to actuate the controllers, but none of these really enhanced the operator’s concentration. 
Looking into studies and researches in the field of psychology it became evident that the 
remote operator’s concentration and sensorimotor performance is highly dependent on 
the feeling of presence. This finding expanded the research work outside the machine 
industry. For example, several studies can be found on techniques on improving the feel-
ing of presence in movie theaters or video games. These findings were then adapted to 
the remote operation of container cranes which resulted in a completely new way of look-
ing into the safety of remote operation. 
 
The preliminary hazard analysis and operational hazard analysis were made based on the 
recognized safety requirements. The analysis work resulted in detailed safety measures, 
which the design of the desk should comply with. Safety measures consisted of require-
ments for the physical controllers of the console and their layout, the ergonomics design 
of the desk and the office environment in which the desk is used. Some requirements were 
set for enhancing the immersion of the operation. The graphical user interface and the 
video user interface would have the most significant effect on the feeling of presence. 
The safety measures included, for example, requirements for the information to be deliv-
ered to the operator and the possibilities for the operator to adjust his working posture and 
field of vision.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The constantly growing level of automation in the container terminals promotes the use 
of remote control. Safety-wise remote control is still a very poorly covered section of the 
industry. The lack of standards and safety guidelines regarding the remote control creates 
some significant challenges in the design of remote control solutions. For an average en-
gineer the concept of human factors can be difficult to grasp. Traditionally engineering is 
based on items that can be measured or adequately estimated and calculated. However, 
the immersion of the operation and the employee well-being definitely have an effect on 
the safety of remote operation. Now this is a combination that must be taken into consid-
eration when designing solutions for remote control. During this thesis work, information 
was gathered from several different fields of science combining psychology and machine 
safety standards. This proved to be an excellent decision providing tons of new aspects 
to the concept of supporting safe operation.  
 
As an outcome of this thesis, human factors were taken into consideration during the 
design work of the renewed ROS. It was ensured that the risks arising from such human 
behavior as lack of consideration were reduced significantly. By creating an immersive 
environment and ensuring that controller layout minimizes unintentional operating com-
mands the safety was increased significantly.   
 
The survey is not complete by any means. The effects that human behavior have on the 
safety of remote operation have to be further examined to ensure that everything possible 
is done during the design work of such solutions. Analysis on human behavior should be 
taken as part of a normal hazard analysis for man operated machines. Possibilities of such 
integration must be further examined. 
 
This thesis provided an interesting challenge since no guidelines or standards existed. The 
research work was very rewarding since it provided chances of innovation through com-
bination of different levels of scientific studies. Successfully analyzing the potential use 
cases required profound knowledge of terminal operations and container handling equip-
ment. This way the thesis work was also a very educating experience combining machine 
safety, technicality and psychology.  
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